The Paris-based think tank Groupe d'Etudes Géopolitiques kindly invited me to contribute to a collection of short takes on whether the EU improved its "strategic autonomy" in 2020. With the text below, I gave a score of 4 (on a 1-to-5 scale) based on the NextGenerationEU recovery plan and its consequence of establishing EU bonds as a reference for sovereign debt markets. The full collection is here (or here in PDF), and also here in French (PDF).
From an economic and financial policy perspective, the agreement on the recovery plan has been the most momentous European development of 2020. Much coverage has gone to the arduous negotiations and to the challenges of apportioning the money and spending it wisely, not least as it entails grants to member states. But arguably the most lasting and structural consequence is about something else: namely, that the plan will be financed by direct issuance of securities by the European Union, or EU bonds. Whereas the EU has been issuing bonds before, the Recovery plan volumes are unprecedented. That changes everything. In the next few years, EU bond issuance will be of the same order of magnitude as that of a large EU member state. EU bonds will become a reference point for the European sovereign debt market. Their interest will be lower than that of most member states, and it will be clear to everyone that they are the best way to finance EU policies – in practice and not just in theory. After a few years, their termination will be rationally viewed as implausible. EU bonds will be used to fund other spending programs, and possibly to refinance the reimbursement of those issued for the Recovery Plan. Even though the question of which “own” (i.e. fiscal) resources back them does not need to be answered immediately, an answer will be found over time. As German finance minister Olaf Scholz and others have put it, the recovery plan may not be a fiscal union yet, but it is a decisive step towards it.